The first summit meeting of the Middle Eastern Quad will happen during President Joe Biden’s trip to the region during 13-16 July. He will be in Israel on 13-14 July, during which he will also make a brief trip to Ramallah, just on the outskirts of Jerusalem. From Israel, he will fly to Jeddah for a summit meeting with the Saudi leadership, especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (more commonly referred to as MbS), whom the American President consciously avoided due to the Khashoggi affair since assuming office in January last year. However, following the footsteps of President Donald Trump’s visit to the region, in Jeddah, President Biden will also attend the summit meeting of GCC plus Three, comprising six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. Given the hectic schedule, the first virtual Quad summit could happen on 13-14 July when the American President is in Jerusalem.
After several alternative names like Mini Quad or Middle Eastern Quad, earlier this month, a State Department Spokesperson called it I2U2. This formation reflects the memberships of two ‘I’s (India and Israel) and two ‘U’s (the United Arab Emirates and the United States). Weeks before the idea gathered momentum, writing in the Washington-based Middle East Institute, Egyptian scholar Mohammed Soliman who first proposed the idea, even suggested Indo-Abrahamic Alliance or Bloc. But, flagging the absence of a formal name until now, some sceptics felt that the group would not even take off after the inaugural meeting of the Foreign Minister last October.
However, the current nomenclature is narrow and restrictive. In the aftermath of the Foreign Ministers’ virtual meeting in October, a host of pro-peace countries like Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain and even France were considered possible candidates for the emerging bloc. Hence while the four will be the core, any expansion would require a new label.
The role of Yair Lapid is rather interesting. Last October, he hosted S Jaishankar as Israel’s Foreign Minister. However, with the impending dissolution of the Knesset, Lapid would take over from Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and govern until a new government is formed after elections scheduled for later this year; hence, this time around, Lapid would be hosting Prime Minister Narendra Modi as Israel’s caretaker prime minister. Besides Biden, Lapid and Modi, the summit will be joined by Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. As the de facto ruler since January 2014, Mohammed al-Nahyan formally became President in May this year following the death of his half-brother.
Since last October, hopes and concerns have been expressed over the political direction of the Middle Eastern Quad, with China and Iran being flagged as its possible targets. Though one can never rule out such a possibility, the chances are not bright. Given their economic and strategic investments and involvements with China, neither Israel nor UAE could afford to make I2U2 an explicitly anti-China forum. Even if such a posture were music to the ears of the other two players, anti-Beijing posturing would be catastrophic for Israel and the UAE, for whom China remains a major trade and investment destination.
Will the forum be anti-Iranian, tailored to the strategic needs of Israel and Saudi Arabia? The pressures and arguments are strong. Without making any concessions to the Palestinians, Israel is able to capitalise on the Sunni Arab concerns and anxieties vis-à-vis Shia Persian Iran. Indeed, shared concern vis-à-vis Iran was the catalyst for the Abraham Accords that Israel concluded with the UAE (and also with Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan) in 2020. The Arab-Israeli normalisation had the tacit blessings of MbS. At the same time, the Mini Quad is unlikely to pursue an anti-Iranian agenda.
Notwithstanding its differences over several political and energy issues, India still sees Iran as a friendlier power and critical player in its approach towards Afghanistan, Pakistan as well as Central Asia. Despite several attempts since the normalisation of relations with Israel in 1992, India carefully avoided joining Israel’s chorus against Iran. Moreover, under President Biden, the US does not have the stomach and wherewithal to pursue an aggressive policy vis-à-vis China or Iran. Trump might have, but Biden can’t.
Hence, the Mini Quad will largely focus on the economic agenda and work towards enhancing trade and investment ties between Israel and the UAE. Given the tension with the US over China, even under the most-friendly Trump Administration, Israel might seek greater investment opportunities from Emirates in its infrastructure and strategic sectors towards lessening its dependence upon Beijing. DP World, for example, which handles 10% of the global container traffic, could be an alternative for several of Israel’s infrastructure plans.
Like all its predecessors, the Biden Administration will work towards bringing other Arab and Islamic countries to normalise relations with Israel. Thus, India figures prominently in the American calculations to expand the peace dividends of the Abraham Accords and make relations with Israel more acceptable regionally. Even Emirates needs greater international legitimacy for its decision to sidestep the Palestinian statehood before forging formal ties with the Jewish state.
The summit meeting will perhaps set the tone and agenda of I2U2. Given the regional flux, one should also expect softer and less controversial issues such as freedom of navigation, protection of sea lanes of communications and fighting organised crimes and terrorism. However, will it emerge as a structured minilateral? The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Indo-Pacific Quad began in 2007, and only in recent years has it gained political prominence primarily due to Beijing’s aggressive posturing towards its members. This growth trajectory of the Middle Eastern Quad will not be any different. Moreover, if the focus of the I2U2 summit is to discuss “food security crisis and other areas of cooperation across hemispheres where the UAE and Israel serve as important innovation hubs,” as outlined by the American officials, then the progress will be less dramatic and not headline catching.
However, the innovative Israeli skills, Emirati resources, Indian human capital and American political commitments could ideally transform the politics-dominated Middle East relations. This implies that the MEA is willing to play second fiddle to the economic and developmental thrusts of the I2U2. Perhaps, a tall order for the status quoist mandarins.
The writer teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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